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


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THE NAVAL QUESTION



LETTERS BY
VICTOR E. MITCHELL K.C.

PUBLISHED IN
THE MONTREAL DAILY STAR

AND

SOME REMARKS BY
HIS GRACE
THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER
ON
PRACTICAL IMPERIALISM

1912

THE NAVAL QUESTION

LETTERS BY
VICTOR E. MITCHELL, K.C.

From The MONTREAL DAILY STAR, October 14th, 1912

To the Editor of *The Montreal Daily Star* :

SIR :—The extract from the letter of "one of the highest political authorities in Great Britain" quoted by Mr. Cahan in his letter published in your issue on Saturday, not only completely justifies the position taken by *The Star*, but admits that no one—not even the "high political authority" or Mr. Cahan himself—can rely upon the reassuring statements of the British Ministers in Parliament as disclosing the real facts of the international situation. This high political authority expressly says there is no way for him, for Mr. Cahan or for us, to find the real facts. It is, therefore, quite apparent that the high political authority does not, like Mr. Cahan, accept the official statements of responsible British Ministers as to the international situation at their face value. Being a "high political authority" he understands that the official relations between sovereign states are always publicly referred to by responsible ministers as friendly until a direct rupture occurs or is imminent, or until diplomatic relations are broken. To characterize Mr. Asquith's and Sir Edward Grey's statements in Parliament as being necessarily diplomatic does not imply that the Premier and the Foreign Secretary are telling lies or that British diplomacy is "steeped in deception." No one knows this better than Mr. Cahan, and it is surprising that a man of his intelligence should attempt to convince the Canadian public that there is no danger of war between Germany and Britain, because, forsooth, the Premier and Sir Edward Grey stated in Parliament that Great Britain's relations with Germany are "excellent" and are likely to remain "relations of amity and good-will." That he has done so shows the great length to which Mr. Cahan is prepared to go in support of Mr. Bourassa's views on the navy question. But the Canadian public are not quite so simple as to be misled by such childish arguments. The average man reads the official statements of British Ministers in Parliament on this subject with the concrete facts before him—facts which I do not think Mr. Cahan or his leader can contest—viz., that Germany has increased her navy in the last ten years to such an extent that last spring, the First Lord of the Admiralty served notice on Germany that there would be an automatic increase of the British Navy for any further extensions of the German naval programme; that in consequence of such further increase, the First Lord brought down supplementary estimates; that practically the whole strength of the British navy, which a few years ago was scattered all over the world, is now concentrated in the North Sea, notwithstanding the fact that thereby Great Britain's

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position and influence in the Near East are considerably weakened ; that Great Britain has been forced to abandon her "splendid isolation," which was the proud boast of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain not so many years ago, and to seek "ententes" with both France and Russia ; that, during the tension caused by the Agadir incident in Morocco, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in a speech at the Mansion House, cried, "Halt" to Germany, and in the debate which followed in the House of Commons, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, the leader of the Labor Party, rose to the occasion and patriotically stated that while the Labor Party might differ with the Government on matters of domestic concern, they were united with all other parties in giving the Government their unqualified support when the interests of the Empire were threatened, no matter what sacrifices it might entail.

Unfortunately, I have not before me Mr. Macdonald's exact words, but I have indicated the spirit of his remarks, which are the more to be commended when one considers that the burden of additional armaments falls proportionally more heavily on the British workman, whom he represents in Parliament, than on any other class in the community.

Mr. Macdonald's speech had probably more effect on the German Government than any other statement made in the debate, as it was no doubt counting on the alleged socialistic and anti-war tendencies of the Labor Party to embarrass the Government on any question of further military and naval expenditures. Would that all parties in Canada could unite and give the British Government a like assurance that Canada was prepared to do its part in maintaining the integrity of the Empire and the navy under whose protection it has grown in wealth, happiness and prosperity, and to the support of which she has not so far contributed one dollar, unless we take into account the amount squandered on the Laurier Navy.

Is this a time to tell the people of Great Britain on whom the whole burden now lies, that Canada cannot contribute a dollar or a ship unless she is given the right to participate in the direction and control of Imperial affairs and International relations ? It is not a question of "no taxation without representation." Great Britain does not seek the right to impose any tax on Canada or any other of the Dominions beyond the seas ; but it is a question as to whether or not those Dominions beyond the seas are going to recognize that they have grown to man's estate under the protection of the British Flag and that the time has come when, as self-respecting, self-governing nations within the Empire, they should contribute of their own free will, and according to their means, to the support of the Navy on which the existence of the whole Empire depends.

Australia is doing her share ; little New Zealand has done nobly and will do more nobly in the future ; and even new South Africa has declared through its Premier—who a few years ago led the Boer forces against her—that when Great Britain is at war, the whole Empire is at war. And Canada, the greatest, the most populous and the wealthiest of them all, has done—what ? Started, under the late Liberal government, a Canadian navy with a few obsolete cruisers on the distinct understanding that they were not to be used in any war in which Great

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Britain might become involved without the consent of the Canadian Parliament.

And now, under the Liberal-Conservative party, that poor crumb has been swept into the dust bin and the British Government and people have been informed (if we are to believe the newspaper reports) that if an emergency arose, or if the British Government declared an emergency existed, Canada would make an immediate direct emergency contribution to the Imperial Navy; but that its permanent contribution—not necessarily to the Imperial Navy—is to be dependent upon Canada being granted the right to participate in the direction and control of Imperial affairs and International relations. Has Mr. Borden evolved any plan by which the self-governing Dominions can effectually participate in such direction and control? The question bristles with difficulties which it will take a long time to solve; and to wait for a satisfactory solution means an indefinite postponement of any permanent contribution. This phase of the Navy question should be allowed to develop as the British Constitution has developed—by a slow process of evolution whereby it adapts itself to the changing conditions of times and circumstances. Then, as regards the emergency proposals, can anything more humiliating to the British people be imagined? If an emergency actually arose, it would be too late to make an effective contribution, and, as Mr. Cahan's "high political authority" points out, the British Government cannot declare that an emergency exists without admitting that they have shirked their duty; and for a further reason, I submit, that by so doing, they would have to lift the veil of secrecy which necessarily covers such important international relations and thereby run the risk of precipitating or hastening the happening of the emergency which the strengthening of the Navy is intended to prevent. Would it be wise even for the British Government to advise the Prime Minister of Canada to state in Parliament that the real facts of the international situation disclosed an "emergency," and upon such a statement to ask the Canadian Parliament to grant an emergency contribution? Would that help the situation? And yet if the British Government is to declare whether or not an emergency exists, such declaration must be made either confidentially to the Canadian Government, or publicly in the British House of Commons, because no public declaration could be made in the Canadian Parliament on the authority of the British Government, unless such declaration had first been made to the British Parliament.

Does Mr. Cahan think that either of these courses would be diplomatic or in the best interests of Great Britain and the Empire? But no, I should not put that question to Mr. Cahan. It is unnecessary, as he has indicated in his letter to *The Star* that he is opposed to any emergency contributions, and has given his reasons. He says:—"Though a policy of 'emergency contributions' might serve as a temporary political make-shift, it may nevertheless, possibly prove to be a mistake and a misfortune, inasmuch as it might, at a time of artificially created panic and alarm, establish a precedent that could never hereafter be disregarded—a precedent which, under existing conditions, is entirely inconsistent with the natural and uniform development of our national political life."

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Mr. Cahan's statement is hedged round with "mays" and "mights"; and he infers that the German war scare is an artificially created panic—I think in a recent letter to one of your contemporaries, he made that positive statement.

What, however, is his point about "an artificially created panic?" Surely, Mr. Cahan would not question the good faith and integrity of the British Ministers by charging them with artificially creating a panic in order to get an emergency contribution from Canada?

Yet, if that is not the insinuation in his letter, I fail to see what he is driving at when he talks of "artificially created panics." Mr. Borden, as Prime Minister, would not ask Parliament to vote an emergency contribution unless the Canadian Cabinet had been satisfied by the British Government that an emergency existed. Under no other circumstances would an "emergency contribution" be asked, as Mr. Cahan knows very well, and yet, he solemnly warns the Canadian people that "an emergency contribution" would establish a precedent that could never hereafter be disregarded, and such a precedent would be inconsistent with the natural and uniform development of our national political life.

Who but Mr. Cahan and his fellow-Nationalists would desire to go back upon a precedent to give a voluntary "emergency contribution" when the British Government satisfied the Canadian Ministers that an emergency existed? How is such a precedent inconsistent with the development of our national life so long as we remain part of the British Empire? If we are not prepared voluntarily to assist Great Britain in an emergency, the sooner we cease to rely upon the British tax payer for our Consular service, for the protection of our overseas commerce and of our rights as British subjects throughout the world and for the other benefits which we enjoy under the British flag, and declare our national dependence, the better for Great Britain; and then we can at our own expense and at our own risk continue the natural and uniform development of our national political life.

But so long as we remain a part of the Empire, is not our duty clear? Why should we wait before making any contribution until an emergency arises, when it would be too late to render effective assistance and why, oh why, should we humiliate the British people and embarrass the British Government by asking for an official declaration that an emergency exists, thereby disclosing to the world at large that in the opinion of the British Ministers the Empire was in danger, and Great Britain needed our assistance?

Should we not act like grown men? Let our Ministers size up the situation for themselves and ask Parliament on their own responsibility to make, not as an emergency contribution and without requiring any quid pro quo in the form of participation in the direction and control of Imperial affairs and international relations, such contribution to the Imperial Navy, both immediate and permanent, and in such form as they may consider consistent with our dignity as the largest and wealthiest self-governing Dominion within the Empire. Whether the German war scare is real or artificial, whether there is an emergency or not, whether it is at present possible to have any participation or control with the British Government or not, and notwithstanding the fact mentioned by

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Mr. Cahan that Great Britain is in no need of Canadian Cash or Credit, the time to act is now. We have delayed too long and surely cannot go on much longer enjoying all the benefits of the Empire and sharing none of its burdens, without losing, not only our own self-respect, but the respect of the whole civilized world.

It is no answer to say, we have shared the burdens of the Empire by maintaining a garrison at Halifax, a few guns at Esquimaux and building the Canadian Pacific Railway, the Grand Trunk Railway and the Canadian Northern Railway, thereby providing all British routes to the far East. These Railways were absolutely necessary adjuncts to the development of Canada and must have been undertaken whether Canada had been part of the Empire or not.

In any event, are the Canadian people content to rest satisfied that in this way they have done all that can reasonably be expected of them?

If not, then, until we have discharged our obligations and done our duty to Great Britain and the Empire, let us cease from boasting that "Canada is the brightest jewel in the British Crown." When we have justified that boast, we can, with clear consciences and thankful hearts, sing

"GOD SAVE THE KING."

VICTOR E. MITCHELL.

From THE MONTREAL DAILY STAR, October 18th, 1912

To the Editor of *The Montreal Star*.

SIR:—Your answer to Mr. Cahan's statement that the present British Government did not abandon the command of the Mediterranean is complete. They did abandon it; but under stress of public opinion they were forced last July to promise to send this Winter a new and stronger fleet to Malta, which, the First Lord of the Admiralty stated, would, in the opinion of the Government, be the best possible arrangement for the next two or two and a half years. This can only be accomplished by weakening to the extent of the ships withdrawn, the Home fleet in the North Sea.

Do not these facts themselves constitute an argument in favor of immediate action on the part of Canada? As Mr. Balfour pointed out, Mr. Churchill admitted that he could not look beyond the next two or two and a half years and that **there might be developments which would require a great change even in these Mediterranean arrangements.** Under these circumstances, is Canada to sit still and do nothing until some scheme can be formulated and carried out whereby she will be granted representation in Imperial affairs?

Mr. Cahan states that the British authorities—Mr. Asquith, Mr. Churchill and the Government generally—apparently enjoy, in respect of their naval programme at least, the complete confidence of the British people. No statement could be farther from the actual facts. The general opinion in England is that the Government has not kept pace with Germany in naval construction, and is now forced to spend vast

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sums which would have been spread over a period of years if the Government had followed an intelligent policy and maintained the full two power standard. And that opinion is shared by naval officers themselves, who, while not daring to speak for general information, express themselves most emphatically to friends and those in whose discretion they trust.

As a sample of criticism by responsible English journals of the Government's action in the Mediterranean, I cite the following from *The Spectator* of July 27th—four days after Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons, quoted by Mr. Cahan,—“In the Spring Mr. Winston Churchill alarmed the nation by letting it be known that he considered that we were spending more naval strength in the Mediterranean than we were justified in spending, considering the situation in the North Sea. Accordingly, he withdrew his battleships from the Mediterranean and brought them into home waters. In doing this, however, it was clearly suggested that the Admiralty were not abandoning our control of the Mediterranean because they liked doing it, or because they were indifferent to the sacrifices involved, but solely out of due necessity and because they dared not sacrifice the greater need to the lesser. But now, though nothing has happened but newspaper criticism—newspaper criticism, of course, which was thoroughly justified—Mr. Churchill has reversed his policy, and is going to place in the Mediterranean ships which will make our position there far stronger than it has been for many years. Further, he is doing this by taking away powerful ships from the North Sea—that is, from the place where so short a time ago we were told their presence was essential. In other words, though the situation in the North Sea, on Mr. Churchill's own showing, has become in the last three months not less, but more, menacing the conclusion from the premises has been absolutely reversed—In our opinion nothing has done more to discredit Mr. Churchill as a statesman than his handling of the Mediterranean problem.”

That is a pretty frank British opinion of Mr. Cahan's star witness on whom he relies to prove, not only that the Mediterranean was not abandoned, but also that the international situation is so satisfactory that there is no need for Canada to make an immediate contribution to the Navy.

But that is not all. *The Spectator* adds: “Mr. Churchill's blunder was probably the worst false step we have made in Naval policy for a century and it will take us many years and much expenditure of naval strength to live it down.”

This same Mr. Churchill is one of the responsible Ministers, whose utterances in Parliament have satisfied Mr. Cahan that the international situation was never happier—Great Britain and Germany are the best of friends—and “never has there been a moment, and there is not now when we have not been overwhelmingly superior in naval force against any combination which could reasonably be anticipated.”

Mr. Cahan says it would be unfortunate if the people of this country should be forced to choose between two alternatives: First, of placing their financial resources at the disposition of an Imperial Government in whose councils they are denied representation for the maintenance of foreign policies, in respect of which they have no direction or control,

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and, in fact, have never been consulted. Who ever suggested that the Dominion Government should place their financial resources at the disposition of the Imperial Government? Many Canadians think that the Dominion Parliament should vote such immediate contribution to the Imperial Navy and make such other permanent arrangements as our own Government will take the responsibility of advising, but that is quite a different thing to placing our financial resources at the disposition of the Imperial Government. While the latter course might be a degradation of colonial citizenship, does Mr. Cahan contend that a voluntary contribution, recommended by our own responsible ministers and approved by Parliament would degrade Canadians?

Mr. Cahan's statement that we have never been consulted by the Imperial authorities is as accurate as many of his other statements. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was on more than one occasion taken into the confidence of the British Ministers, as were also Mr. Borden and some of his colleagues during the past summer.

The second alternative mentioned by Mr. Cahan is to restrict our naval and military expenditures to such as are necessary for the protection of our own coasts and international boundaries, until the increase of our population and the development of our own internal resources shall warrant us in assuming control of our own international relations, by taking our place among the nations of the world as an independent sovereign state.

It would be many a year and cost many a million before we had a military and naval force of our own sufficient to protect our own coasts and our long boundaries; and in the meantime, great Britain is "to pay the piper," and not one dollar is to be contributed to the defence of the Empire upon whose protection we would have to rely until we were strong enough to declare our independence.

Well may Mr. Cahan say that the second alternative constitutes a repudiation of the best political traditions in which we have been born and bred, but who can force Canada against her will to accept such an alternative, who in Canada, except some extreme Nationalists, advocate the adoption of such an alternative?

Are we to understand that Mr. Cahan himself advises the Canadian Government and people to chose this alternative rather than make a contribution to the support of the Imperial Navy without immediate representation in Imperial affairs? If so, let him say so in plain English, so that we may all know where he stands.

The third alternative mentioned by Mr. Cahan, I presume, is a contribution with representation in Imperial affairs, the principle of which has certainly "been splendidly asserted and courageously advocated by Mr. Borden in England." Let us see how the English people appreciate and accept this principle; and for this purpose, I cannot do better than quote from a leading article, commenting on Mr. Borden's recent speeches in Toronto and Montreal, which appeared in the issue of *The Times* (Weekly Edition), September 27th.

There was no new pronouncement in Mr. Borden's stirring speech, and none was expected, for his declaration of policy, is reserved for the meeting of Parliament in November. . . . He reiterated with the same emphasis as before, his belief in union of

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the Empire for all purposes of defence. The conditions of such union cannot be worked out in a day, but the principle is plain. Mr. Borden repeated it amid great enthusiasm in Montreal on Saturday, when he declared that 'with co-operation in defence must come a certain voice by Canada in the interests of peace and war.' These are the views which he has already expounded with dignity and force during his visit to England, and he is perfectly justified in assuring his fellow-countrymen in Canada that the principle for which he has contended is accepted and welcomed by their fellow-subjects in the Mother Country. The more it is discussed the more widely, we are certain, will the profound importance of Mr. Borden's initiative this year be understood and appreciated. It is widely felt in this country that he has opened new avenues of thought on the Imperial problem. That is a great service in itself, and one more and more required of Imperial statesmen at a moment when the dangers by which the Empire is menaced seem to grow more swiftly than the general capacity of our peoples for realizing them. But Mr. Borden is not a thinker only. . . . He has left his mark upon us as a statesman in whom foresight and grasp of principle are combined with solid judgment and a rare command of ways and means. He has made us feel that his word is as good as his bond, and that when his mind is set, his powers of action are equal to his capacity for thought. We have few men amongst us in whom are so well blended the thorough habits of the student with the practical ability of the man of affairs. The sight of students is usually too long, and that of politicians too short. The imagination which overlooks the practical difficulties of a course is as useless by itself as the opportunism which gives way to difficulties the minute they are felt. Mr. Borden, we believe, has power to see both the distant goal and the ground before his feet; and we have given him our confidence in this country as a statesman who will choose his course with wisdom but will not turn aside from his aims.

I wonder whether Mr. Cahan's "sight" is that of the student or of the politician; but, he certainly has the "imagination" which overlooks the practical difficulties of the course he is advocating.

While Mr. Borden and his colleagues will steadfastly work for the union of the Empire, for all purposes of defence and a "voice," not only by Canada, but by the other self-governing Colonies in Imperial affairs, yet I do not believe the Government will refrain from asking Parliament to grant a contribution—and a substantial one—to the Navy until that "voice" in Imperial affairs has become a *fait accompli*.

Mr. Borden has done well in one brief visit to obtain the acceptance by the British Ministers of the principle that co-operation in defence entails corresponding co-operation in responsibility and advice. We can well leave it to him and his Cabinet to devise a scheme to carry the principle into practical effect in a manner satisfactory to the British Government and the Governments of the other Dominions beyond the Seas. But this will take time, and action should not be deferred until it is accomplished.

Let Canada do something now.

VICTOR E. MITCHELL.

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From *THE MONTREAL DAILY STAR*, October 25th, 1912

To the Editor of *The Montreal Star* :

SIR,—Mr. Cahan, in his fourth letter to *The Star* again attempts to obscure the real issue. He says:

Persistent appeals are made to Canadians to assume a share of Great Britain's financial burdens, on the plea that Canada has financial obligations to Great Britain which have never been liquidated. These appeals are based on the assumption that Great Britain, in the wars with France that were ended by the Treaty of Paris in 1763, in the war of the American Revolution 1775-1783, in the war of 1812, expended hundreds of millions of dollars, of which Canada is morally bound to assume and pay a certain share, which varies according to the fanciful computations of the arithmeticians who seek to impose these new obligations upon us.

Personally, I never heard it suggested before that Canada rests under such a moral obligation. The expense of founding and maintaining the Empire has, up to the present time, been cheerfully borne by the British nation, and no Britisher (English, Scotch, or Irish) considers that any moral obligation rests upon Canada, Australia, New Zealand or South Africa to return to the British exchequer one dollar of the money so expended; but a feeling is growing in Great Britain that the wealthy Dominions beyond the seas should now contribute according to their means and resources, towards the expense of maintaining the Navy upon which the very existence of the whole Empire depends. This is a very different matter to the Overseas Dominions returning to the British Treasury any portion of the money which Great Britain has expended in building up the Empire.

Mr. Cahan proceeds :

But, admitting for the moment, that Canada has obligations to Great Britain, to whom are we in duty bound to make payment? To the present generation of Englishmen who have inherited English estates, for which the present holders have neither toiled nor spun, which consist of a thousand years of accumulated wealth, greater than is possessed by any other European State?

Are we, Canadians, of this generation to pay to the present generation of Englishmen, resident in England, the expenses, or a share of the expenses, incurred in the past by fifty generations of Englishmen in creating new markets and extending their trade and commerce upon every sea and to every land, protecting their investments, increasing their profits, until they have become and continue to be the richest and most powerful commercial community in the world?

It seems to me that the present generation of Englishmen, resident in England, fortunate heirs-in-possession of the accumulated wealth of England, must be considered as entering into their entailed estate, only upon condition that they shall assume the fixed charges that have hitherto attached to it; and even so their surplus wealth is beyond comparison with that which we in this country can hope to create for several centuries to come.

The meaning of these rhetorical utterances is extremely obscure.

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By the "present generation of Englishmen" does Mr. Cahan mean simply the Englishmen who have inherited English landed estates, or the general body of Englishmen, Scotchmen and Irishmen who constitute the British nation, and who must necessarily inherit all the advantages of trade and commerce which result from the energies, foresight and moneys expended by their ancestors? The latter is the only reasonable interpretation, because it is absurd to contend that "only the Englishmen who have inherited the English estates for which they have neither toiled nor spun" inherit all the advantages and accumulated wealth of Great Britain. Mr. Cahan also draws the inference that the accumulated wealth of Great Britain is so great that the present generation of Englishmen should continue to bear all the expenses of maintaining the Empire. On this phase of the matter, it is interesting to compare the national wealth of Great Britain per head with the national wealth of Canada per head.

According to an article on "Imperial Defence and Finance" in the August "Nineteenth Century," the per capita wealth of Great Britain is £351, and the per capita wealth of Canada is £288. The relative expenditures on defence are as follows: Great Britain, £1 12s 3d per head and Canada £0 6s 5d per head, while Australasia, with a per capita wealth of £287, expends £1 per head on defence.

It would seem from these figures that the accumulated wealth of Great Britain is not proportionately so very much in excess of the accumulated wealth of Canada, and the figures demonstrate quite clearly that Canada is quite able to expend a very much larger sum on defence than she actually does without running any risk of impoverishing her people.

The author of the article in the "Nineteenth Century" has outlined a plan by which the self-governing colonies may be granted participation in Imperial affairs, and I would commend this article to Mr. Cahan. He will find it interesting and instructive.

As regards Mr. Cahan's objection to discharging any of our obligations—and he admits that Canada has great obligations to Great Britain—to the present generation of Englishmen, it would be interesting to know, if we are ever to discharge any of these obligations, how we are to do so except by a payment or contribution in some form which will enure to the benefit of the generation of Englishmen at the time such payment or contribution is made.

Mr. Cahan asks the following question:

But I may ask, have English Colonists committed any crime that they should forfeit for all time the pledge of equal civil rights which was guaranteed by an English King to the first English settlers on this Continent and to "their children and posterity," that they should here continue to enjoy all the 'liberties, franchises and immunities' of natural subjects of the Crown "to all intents and purposes as if they had been abiding and born within this our Realm of England?"

Will Mr. Cahan explain how a voluntary contribution to Imperial defence recommended by our own responsible Ministers and authorized by the Dominion Parliament, can deprive us of the equal civil rights which we were granted by the King?

Mr. Cahan also asks:

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Is there any moral debt, payable now in dollars, which should be assumed by the sons of the Loyalists, who, after having lost all material wealth in the American Revolutionary Wars, made their way, in rags and tatters, hungry and footsore, to hew out for themselves and their descendants new homes in the Maritime Provinces or in the almost impenetrable wildernesses north of the Great Lakes?

As I have pointed out above, no such moral debt rests upon the sons of the United Empire Loyalists; but it is a matter of history that the United Empire Loyalists were willing even to be taxed by the British Crown in America, and rather than join those Colonists who stood upon the principle that there should be no "taxation without representation," fought with the King's Army, and after the War of Secession and after they had been despoiled of their property and effects by the successful Colonists, marched in rags and tatters to Canada to live under the British Flag, and did not think the sacrifice too great for this privilege. I am quite sure that it is not the sons of the United Empire Loyalists who to-day are asking the Canadian Government to withhold its hand from making a contribution to Imperial defence until Great Britain accords representation in Imperial affairs.

The next question put by Mr. Cahan,

Is there now any moral obligation resting upon the descendants, in Canada, of the early French settlers, to pay in whole or in part the costs of the wars by which their race was conquered in New France and made forever a British possession?

is calculated to stir up national prejudice and race feeling.

One more extract—and the last—I shall quote from Mr. Cahan's letter:

Have the Irish and Scotch emigrants, whose fathers and mothers were driven by political conditions, by poverty or by lack of opportunity in the old lands, to seek new homes in this new world, any moral responsibility for the payment of the expenses of the past wars by which England established her commercial supremacy throughout the world?

This question can also be answered emphatically in the negative, but it is interesting, as it shows that Mr. Cahan realizes that, notwithstanding the wonderful wealth accumulated by Great Britain during the last "fifty generations," many of its inhabitants are forced by poverty or lack of opportunity in the old land to seek new homes in this new world.

Mr. Cahan's "fifty generations," however, takes us back to about the year 412—just about the time the Roman legions were withdrawn from Britain. The Empire is not quite as old as that. Until 1583, when nominal possession was taken of Newfoundland by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, the Sovereignty of the English Crown had not extended beyond the limits of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. All the Colonies and Dependencies of Great Britain have been acquired since the date mentioned.

To show that the expense of the maintenance of the Empire has fallen more largely upon the present generation of Englishmen than on any preceding generation, it is only necessary to mention that the British

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Budget has, in the past thirty years, increased from about £80,000,000 to nearly £200,000,000, and that the taxpayers of the United Kingdom are paying £73,000,000 for defence in the year 1912-13, which almost equal the total British Budget of thirty years ago, and yet, if I understand Mr. Cahan correctly, he still insists that no contribution should be made by Canada towards Imperial defence unless the British Government publish to the world that an emergency exists, or until Great Britain is prepared to give Canada representation in Imperial affairs, and then only if the matter is first submitted by the Government to the people. To make a contribution upon any other terms Mr. Cahan contends is entirely incompatible with the spirit of British institutions and government, and that no government has the moral or legal right to degrade a people of its own kith and kin to the lower level of a mere tributary state. We are, therefore, to conclude that in the opinion of Mr. Cahan the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, by making voluntary contributions to the Imperial Navy without representation in Imperial affairs, have degraded their people and sunk their countries to the lower level of mere tributary states.

But, as a matter of fact, everybody thinks the more of these sister states for their patriotic action, and our pride is all the greater when we realize that the governments of both Australia and New Zealand are controlled by the Labor Party.

VICTOR E. MITCHELL.

Montreal.

From *THE MONTREAL DAILY STAR*, November 2nd, 1912

To the Editor of *The Montreal Star* :

SIR,—In my letter which was published in *The Star* on October 14th, I stated that the question of the representation of the Overseas Dominions in Imperial affairs bristled with difficulties which it would take a long time to solve.

The Right Honorable Herbert Samuel, M.P., Postmaster-General, in a very interesting article on Federal Government in the October number of "The Nineteenth Century," discusses this subject at great length, and points out many of the difficulties which will have to be solved before the self-governing colonies can share with Great Britain, not only the responsibilities, but the control of Imperial affairs. This can only be accomplished by the formation of some Federal authority which would, by the common consent of Great Britain and her colonies, have jurisdiction over those matters in which the whole Empire is interested, as apart from those which are of mere local or domestic interest. But, as Mr. Samuel points out:

"The creation of a central authority chosen by the whole Empire and governing its common affairs would obviously be a task surrounded by the most formidable difficulties. The most important of the common interests is defence. Defence is largely a matter of finance. Is the Federal Parliament to have powers of levying taxation in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions? If so, how are such powers to be enforced? What is to happen if one part of the Empire dissents from

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the legislation passed by the Federal Parliament? Is it possible to devise a constitution in such a way that its laws should be operative only if the representatives of all countries subject to it concur in their passing, or should be operative only in the territories of such of them as do concur?

"Responsible to a Federal Parliament would be a Federal Executive, dealing with foreign affairs, naval and military defence, and questions of trade. Could the statesmen drawn from the Dominions as members of such an executive be able at once to share at the centre in the conduct of its current business, and also to keep in sufficiently close touch with the countries from which they came to remain authoritative exponents of their views? What step can be contemplated if the representatives of one or two of the Dominions in the Federal Cabinet were to dissent from the policy of the rest, and, with the approval of their constituents, were to resign their posts? These are some of the problems with which the Imperial Federation is confronted. No blunder could be worse than prematurely to attempt their solution before there is a general will to find a way."

Can Mr. Cahan satisfactorily answer the questions so pertinently put by Mr. Samuel?

Mr. Samuel frankly admits that at present the Government of the United Kingdom is over-centralized and the Government of the Empire under-centralized, but he has no doubt that in time there will be developed some form of Federal Government which will adjust itself to the complex needs of the whole Empire. Something has already been accomplished in this direction.

"The constitutional organs"—I quote from Mr. Samuel's article—"which serve equally the whole Empire are three: first, the Monarchy, which is in form, and to a great extent in practice, the moving force of the whole system; second, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, containing representatives of the Dominions and of India, which acts as a Federal Court of Appeal; and third, the Imperial Conference, which, although possessing neither legislative nor executive power, greatly influences, by the resolutions it passes at its quadrennial meetings, the actions of the authorities it represents.

"To these a fourth is in process of being added. The Committee of Imperial Defence is composed as a rule only of members of the Executive of the United Kingdom, but the Prime Minister summons to its meetings, when occasion requires and opportunity offers, representatives of the Dominion Government also. As those Governments recognize more fully their obligations to share the burdens of the common defence, the consultations about its organization must become more regular, the attendance of Dominion representatives at the Committee of Imperial Defence is likely to become more constant, and it is probable that at no distant time that body will take rank as one of the Federal institutions of the Empire."

What form the Federal authority will ultimately take, no man,—unless, indeed, it be Mr. Cahan—can predicate, but the signs of the times show that, not only in Canada and the other self-governing colonies, but in Great Britain itself, there is a movement towards the Federal

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type of government for purely Imperial affairs, and this movement can be left to develop in the way the British Constitution itself has developed, by gradually adapting itself to the needs of the Empire.

"In that development," Mr. Samuel says, "there can be little doubt such elements of Federalism as may suit the case will be brought in to correct the present over-centralization of the Government of the United Kingdom and the under-centralization of the Government of the Empire."

I do not think Mr. Cahan or any other Canadian need worry about Canada being offered some participation in Imperial affairs by Great Britain. It will come in good time—probably before Canada is prepared to assume her proper share of the obligations which participation necessarily entails.

But in the meantime what the vast majority of Canadians want is that the Government should recommend and Parliament should authorize, without delay, a contribution to the maintenance of the British Navy, worthy of our great and prosperous Dominion.

VICTOR E. MITCHELL.

Montreal, November 1st, 1912.

PRACTICAL IMPERIALISM

AN EXTRACT FROM AN ARTICLE BY

HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER, G.C.V.O.

¶ In the November issue of

"The Nineteenth Century and After"

One of the most remarkable phenomena of modern times is the rise and growth of Imperialist feeling throughout the United Kingdom and the British Dominions.

History runs in cycles. The glorious period of the Napoleonic wars was not unnaturally followed by a great reaction. After the tremendous warlike exertions which had cost Great Britain approximately £1,000,000,000 the nation required peace and rest. The great influence which the landowning aristocracy used to exercise declined owing to the growth of the manufacturing industries and the manufacturing towns. Through the Reform Bill the middle class, composed of merchants, manufacturers, shipowners, etc., became the controlling element in the Legislature, and these hastened to make the best use of their opportunities. The utilitarian era began. Henceforth national policy was to be subservient to individual advantage, to commercial considerations. The people were told that the Colonies were unprofitable, that they were an encumbrance and a burden to the Motherland. The planful development of the Empire which former generations had pursued was discontinued. A sentiment frankly hostile to the Empire arose. Free Trade was introduced. Its essence was, in the words of Cobden: "Buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market." The trading interest was enthusiastically in favour of Free Trade in the expectation that it would be extremely beneficial to the manufacturing industries of the country. Incidentally it was hoped that Free Trade would break up the Empire and rid Great Britain of her Colonies. Cobden prophesied that Free Trade would gradually and imperceptibly loosen the bonds between Motherland and Colonies, and looked forward to their amicable separation.

The rule of the middle class has come to an end. Democracy has arrived. A democratic national policy has taken the place of the ancient utilitarianism, and Imperialism is merely the latest, and I think the highest, incarnation of our democratic nationalism. It is a conscious manifestation of the solidarity of the race. British Imperialism is not, as its opponents assert, an empty, vain-glorious, and aggressive policy advocated by "Jingoes," by the aristocracy, the leisured classes, and the army. It is a thoroughly democratic policy. This can be seen by the fact that it is strongest not in these islands, but in our most democratic possessions. Imperialism, contrary to widely held opinion, is democratic, peaceful, and utilitarian in the best sense of the word, for it is useful and necessary.

It is a trite but true saying that peace is the greatest interest of Great and Greater Britain. Only in peace can we develop our magnificent resources. But our peace is threatened.

The British Empire extends over 11,447,954 square miles. It is

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nearly one hundred times as large as the United Kingdom. It embraces vast areas situated in a temperate zone, which have room for hundreds of millions of white settlers. We possess besides most valuable tropical Colonies, countless islands and nearly all the most important strategical positions in the world which dominate all seas. Very naturally the British Empire is the envy of the universe, and especially of those nations which desire or require colonies and well-situated naval bases.

A nation can be secure only if its armed strength is commensurate with its possessions. The British Empire is by far the largest Empire which the world has seen. It is essentially a maritime Empire, and it is most vulnerable from the sea. While the principal towns of most countries lie far inland, all the largest towns of the British Empire, such as London, Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Portsmouth, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen, Dundee, Dublin, Belfast, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Rangoon, Colombo, Aden, Singapore, Hong Kong, Melbourne, Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth, Hobart, Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin, Montreal, Quebec, Vancouver, Victoria, St. John's, Cape Town, Durban, and many others, lie on, or close to, the sea. All these towns can easily be shelled or seized by a foreign Power possessing the command of the sea.

The British Empire is a sea Empire. It depends for its livelihood very largely upon the sea. The value of its seaborne trade should in the present year amount to the stupendous sum of £2,000,000,000. The British Empire possesses one-half of the world's shipping. We may say that one-half of the world's trade is carried under the British flag. Out of every two ships which sail the ocean one flies the British flag. Our merchant marine will therefore be exposed to enormous losses in time of war unless our Navy is overwhelmingly strong. The British Empire does not possess the sea, but it has certainly a predominant interest on all seas.

While the prosperity of the British Dominions depends on the free flow of their enormous exports over sea, the existence of the United Kingdom depends on the free and uninterrupted flow of our sea-borne imports of food and raw materials. One-half of the meat, seven-eighths of the wheat, and all the sugar which we consume are imported by sea. Our factories are dependent on cotton, wool, timber, hides, ores, oil, and other raw materials borne by ships to these shores. Sometimes the stock of wheat in the United Kingdom suffices for only six weeks. A short stoppage of our imports, even if it be only a partial one, would close our factories and cause starvation.

If a hostile Power, or combination of Powers, should defeat our fleet, it need not invade this country. A powerful enemy can bombard the principal towns of Great Britain and of her possessions, starve out the garrisons of her naval bases, ruin our shipping trade, prey upon the export trade of our Dominions and Colonies, and starve the United Kingdom into surrender. It is therefore clear that Motherland and Colonies require for their protection a fleet strong enough to meet any possible combination of Powers. These considerations prompted Great Britain to establish the two-Power standard, according to which the British fleet was to be at least as strong as the combined fleets of the two strongest foreign Powers.

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Formerly the naval supremacy of Great Britain was undisputed and indisputable, but changing circumstances have affected our position in the world. A few decades ago Germany consisted of a number of disunited and impecunious States which had no fleet, the population of the United States was smaller than that of the United Kingdom. Japan was as weak at sea as Siam, Russia had no railways, the Suez Canal did not exist. The navies of the foreign powers were insignificant. It was not necessary for Great Britain to maintain a two-Power standard, for her fleet was predominant on all seas. As Russia was separated from India by vast roadless and railwayless deserts, and as transport by sea was very little developed, ships being few, small, and slow, the invasion of India by land and that of the United Kingdom by sea was not practicable. The times have changed. Powerful navies are being built in many countries, and all countries, even the South American Republics, endeavour to build more powerful battleships than the latest British Dreadnoughts. Our sea monopoly is a thing of the past. Russian railways run up to the Indian frontier. An invasion of India is no longer impossible. The great development of the merchant marine, the advent of numerous large and fast passenger steamers, makes the invasion of Great Britain and the Colonies much easier than it used to be. Our interest in the Suez Canal and in Egypt has given us another point where we are extremely vulnerable and are exposed to attacks both by land and sea. During the last fifty years the comparative strength of Great Britain has declined while the vulnerability of the British Empire has greatly increased.

Great Britain possesses a much smaller area and a much denser population than her national competitors. Her population increases very slowly, and a very large number of her citizens emigrate every year. While the British population grows but slowly, that of her principal competitors increases very quickly. Russia has 161,000,000 inhabitants, and her population increases by 3,000,000 per year; the United States have 92,000,000 inhabitants, and their population increases by 1,600,000 per year. Germany has 66,000,000 inhabitants, and her population increases by 900,000 per year; the United Kingdom has 45,000,000 inhabitants, and her population increases by less than 400,000 per year. Man power is more important than engine power. Gradually, and almost imperceptibly, Great Britain is losing her great position in the world owing to the comparative stagnation of her population and the rapid growth of the leading foreign States. Wealth is power. The longest purse can buy the strongest fleet. It is impossible for 45,000,000 Englishmen to maintain the two-Power standard against 66,000,000 Germans and some other prosperous nation. There is a limit to the taxation which the people can bear. The two-Power standard has been abandoned.

At the time when the British Navy was all-powerful Great Britain could stand alone in splendid isolation. Now we are no longer able to rely for our security upon our own unaided strength. We have to put our trust in complicated diplomatic arrangements which may break down at the critical moment. At present our position is perfectly secure owing to our understanding with France and Russia and our alliance with Japan. However, treaties and understandings do not last

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for all time. The Balkan war, or some other event, may upset many existing friendships, or a skilful diplomat may rearrange the grouping of the Powers to our disadvantage. A State which is very vulnerable and which at the same time is rich in valuable possessions is exposed to the danger of attack by a hostile coalition. Therefore we should rely for our defence only on our own strength. In our own strength alone we can find safety.

As our population and wealth increase comparatively slowly, while the population and wealth of our great national competitors grow comparatively quickly, Great Britain will from year to year find it more difficult to hold her own in a world of large States. From year to year it is becoming increasingly clear that Great Britain cannot provide for the defence of the Empire single-handed. Recognizing our difficulties--our Dominions have come to our aid with splendid generosity. They are providing fleets and armies. But we cannot safely rely for the defence of the Empire on the present loose arrangements between Great Britain and the Dominions. The Empire requires for its security an Imperial Army and an Imperial Fleet, paid for out of an Imperial exchequer, and controlled and directed by an Imperial Government. The defence of the Empire must be organized. But only the unification of the Empire will make possible the creation of an adequate organization. That has been recognized by the leading Colonial statesmen. Therefore they have urged us to call them to our councils.

The unification of the Empire is necessary, not only for its defence, but also for its development. The time of small States is past. The future belongs to the great States. In the first chapter of his "Wealth of Nations" Adam Smith demonstrated by his description of the manufacture of pins the superior efficiency of the factory system, which allows the division of labour, over the small employer and the individual artisan. The factory system applies not only to the manufacturing industries but also to States. Greatness in States makes not only for strength and security but also for efficiency in every branch of human activity owing to a better division and application of labour. The greater the national market the greater the industrial efficiency of the nation. In a small but highly-cultured State, such as Sweden, there is no room for an iron industry as large, and therefore as efficient, as that at Pittsburg. Efficiency in art and science also favoured by a large State, for only a large and prosperous State can give an adequate scope to its talented citizens. A great electrician, engineer, chemist, financier, inventor, painter, or sculptor, born in some small State, such as Denmark or Holland, will naturally seek occupation in some larger State.

The unification of the Empire makes not only for strength, peace, progress and prosperity, but also for social betterment. To lift up the masses we require two things; security and prosperity. Without security from foreign attack there will be little prosperity.